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ABSTRACT
For 188 independent countries in 2000, 72 had no state religion in the years 2000, 1970, and 1900;
58 had a state religion at all three dates; and 58 had some kind of transition. Among the 58
transitional countries, 12 had two transitions, 4 of which (former Soviet Republics in Asia) involved
two forms of state religion. The probability of having a state religion in 2000 or 1970 depends
strongly on the status of state religion in 1900 but much more so for countries that experienced no
major change in political regime during the 20th century. Communist governments tend not to have
state religion – only one Communist country (Somalia in 1970) had a state religion in the usual
sense. However, a past history of Communism does not have much influence on the probability of
state religion. Greater concentration of religious adherence is positively related to state religion, and
most of this relation seems to reflect causation from religious concentration to state religion, rather
than the reverse. Theoretically, state religion is more probable when the population adheres to a
monotheistic religion. We find this effect for Muslim adherence, but the relationship is not robust.
State religion is less likely in sub-Saharan Africa, possibly because of the intense competition for
converts in this region among the major world religions. The probability of state religion does not
differ significantly between former colonies and non-colonies but is higher for British colonies than
for Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Variables that have little effect on the probability of state












mccleary@wcfia.harvard.edu  State religion plays a central role in Adam Smith’s vision of the religion market 
(Smith [1791, Book V, Article III]).  According to Smith, the key aspect of state religion 
is its promotion of the monopoly position of the favored religion.  This promotion works 
partly through limitations on entry of competitors and partly through subsidies.  Smith’s 
analysis focuses on the adverse consequences from the monopoly positions of the 
Anglican Church in England and the Catholic Church in other countries.  He argues that 
monopoly providers of religious services tend—as monopolies do generally—to become 
non-innovative and indolent.  Consequently, service quality and religious participation 
decline.  This argument has been broadened in modern analyses of the “religion-market 
model” by Stark and Bainbridge (1987), Finke and Stark (1992), Iannaccone (1991), and 
Finke and Iannaccone (1993). 
  Our previous research (McCleary and Barro [2003]) investigated the effects of 
state religion on religiosity.  We found from country averages of survey data for the 
1980s and 1990s that the presence of state religion raised religious participation and 
beliefs.  Our interpretation was that the subsidy element in state religion—which 
typically encourages investment in organized religion—dominated over the monopoly 
element—which curtails competition and, thereby, reduces religious participation.  These 
relationships applied when we held fixed a measure of government regulation of the 
religion market and an index of religious pluralism.  Consistent with the religion-market 
model, we found that religious participation and beliefs fell with regulation (in the sense 
that the government appointed or approved religious leaders) and with a decrease in 
religious pluralism.   2
  In another paper (Barro and McCleary [2003]), we used our findings about the 
determinants of religiosity to estimate the effects of church attendance and religious 
beliefs on economic growth in a panel of countries from 1965 to 1995.  Our estimation 
procedure isolated causation from religiosity to economic performance, rather than the 
reverse, by using instrumental variables for religiosity.  The instruments were dummy 
variables for the presence of state religion and state regulation of religion and measures 
of the composition of religious adherence.  This analysis assumed that the presence or 
absence of a state religion was exogenous with respect to economic growth.  Hence, we 
neglected the possibility—emphasized by secularization theorists—that increasing 
incomes would induce countries to drop state religions.
1 
  In the present study, we try to explain the choice of state religions.  This choice is 
a political calculus that involves interactions between the government and the religion 
sector.  Thus, we can analyze establishment as a political-institutional decision that 
involves benefits and costs from the promotion of a monopoly religion.   
  The benefits from state religion include gains from monopoly power for the 
dominant religion provider.  Benefits to the state may involve control over the religion 
sector.  For example, in Communist countries and some other dictatorships, avoidance of 
state religion is part of a policy to weaken the power of organized groups that would 
otherwise compete with the state.  However, in theocracies such as present day Iran, the 
maintenance of an official state religion becomes part of the government’s plan for 
controlling society. 
                                                 
1 This idea appears in Weber (1930) and has been extended in Wilson (1966), Berger (1967), and Chaves 
(1994).   3
  The costs from state religion include losses for excluded providers and to 
individuals who are taxed or whose choices are constrained.  However, as in Olson’s 
(1965) analysis, free-rider problems involved in organizing collective action may mean 
that the costs to individuals are not effectively transmitted through the political process as 
constraints on government policy.   
  Gill (2002) has argued that studies of religious liberty should take the form of 
positive analyses of why the government regulates religious organizations in a particular 
way.  Our approach to the existence of state religion accords in spirit with the one 
proposed by Gill. 
  We want to understand the determinants of state religion for two reasons.  First, 
we found before that the presence of a state religion has important consequences for the 
workings of the religion market and, hence, for the extent of religious participation and 
beliefs.  These relationships matter, in turn, for economic growth.  That is, by influencing 
religious participation and beliefs, the establishment of a state religion ultimately has 
consequences for economic growth and probably for other economic, political, and social 
variables.  Given these effects from state religion, it is useful to isolate the underlying 
factors that influence the establishment decision. 
  Second, more narrowly, our investigation of economic growth hinged on the 
treatment of the state-religion variable as exogenous with respect to per capita GDP.  Our 
analysis of the determinants of state religion will help to ascertain whether this treatment 
was satisfactory.  It may turn out—as we believe it does—that the presence of state 
religion is nearly exogenous with respect to the dependent variable that we focused on—
economic growth—so that our analysis of the effects of religiosity on growth was   4
satisfactory.  Nevertheless, the presence of a state religion is endogenous in a fuller sense 
that includes variables other than per capita GDP.  We isolate some of these variables in 
the present study. 
  Previous research has sought to explain other forms of political choices and 
institutions across societies.  For example, a research program initiated by Aristotle 
(1932) and taken up by Lipset (1959), Barro (1999), and Przeworski, et al (2000) 
analyzes why some countries are democratic and others are not.  Empirical analyses have 
stressed the effects of economic development on political and legal structure, including 
the extent of electoral rights, civil liberties, rule of law, and official corruption. This 
research program relates to modernization theory, whereby economic development is 
posited to lead to an array of changes in social and political institutions.  This theory, 
discussed in Bell (1973) and Inglehart and Baker (2000), is reminiscent of the economic 
determinism of Marx (1913, pp. 11-12).  Modernization theory has sometimes been 
applied to state religion, notably in the secularization view that economic development 
makes state religion less likely.  However, our study does not find an important influence 
of economic development on the propensity to have state religion. 
   
I.  Historical Context 
  Many state religions go back hundreds of years and were introduced for reasons 
that are likely to be independent of forces that operated in the 20
th century.  For example, 
we will not attempt to explain the Protestant Reformation initiated by Luther and Calvin 
in the early 1500s, but this event continues to be important in the Christian world.  One 
well-known sidelight of the Reformation was Henry VIII’s ouster of the Roman Catholic   5
Church in 1534, purportedly over the Pope’s refusal to grant permission for a divorce.  
The divorce issue was only one of many conflicts between Henry VIII and Rome, and the 
confiscation of church property was probably a more significant motivation for the 
change of official religion.  However, our main point is that, for purposes of 20
th century 
analysis, we can reasonably take as given the establishment of the Anglican Church in 
England in 1536-40.  Moreover, this exogenous event seems to have a lot to do with the 
continuing presence of the Anglican state religion in England. 
  Although Henry’s actions are familiar, less well known is the ouster of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Sweden by King Gustaf Vasa in 1527.  The establishment of the 
Lutheran church seemed motivated primarily by the desire to confiscate the Catholic 
Church’s wealth, following a period of expensive and bloody warfare through 1520, after 
which Sweden separated from Denmark.  The continuing presence of the Lutheran state 
church in Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia likely stems from these long ago events at 
the time of the Reformation.  (Sweden abandoned its official state religion only in 2000, 
but Lutheranism remains the state religion in the other Scandinavian countries.) 
  Our analysis does not attempt to explain Henry VIII’s actions in 1534 or Gustaf 
Vasa’s in 1527.  Going back further, we also do not explain why the Orthodox Church 
separated from the Roman Catholic Church in the Great Schism of 1054, why 
Catholicism and Islam became the state religions of many countries much earlier, or why 
Buddhism arose out of Hinduism in India some 500 years before Christ and gradually 
became prominent in parts of East Asia.  Operationally, we take as given the status of 
state religion in a region at some point in the past and, for us, the relevant date is a   6
relatively recent one, 1900.  This year is the earliest time at which we have a broad 
classification of countries in terms of state religions.   
  The starting date of 1900 means that we do not analyze relatively recent events 
from the 1500s through the 1800s.  For example, we do not explain the counter-
Reformation, which led to more religious tolerance with the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 
and its eventual confirmation and extension in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.  The 
Peace of Augsburg granted tolerance to Lutherans in the Hapsburg Empire.  The Treaty 
of Westphalia extended this tolerance to the Reformed (Calvinist) Church.  Thus, by 
1648, tolerance applied to the three great religious communities of the Empire—Roman 
Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism.  With the Peace of Westphalia, the member 
states agreed to respect private worship, liberty of conscience, and rights of migration for 
religious minorities and dissidents within their domains. 
  Other events that we do not explain include the establishment of Catholicism in 
the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America and of forms of Protestantism in 
most of the colonies of what was to become the United States.
2  In our main analysis, this 
variety of historical experience shows up as initial conditions in 1900.  Our focus is on 
how state religion evolved over the next 100 years—specifically, we concentrate on data 
on the presence of state religion in 1970 and 2000. 
  In this study, we categorize official state religion as an all-or-nothing choice.  
However, the official state church in some countries—say England or Scandinavia—
                                                 
2 The Anglican Church was the official religion of the largest number of colonies, notably in the South.  
However, the Congregationalist Church (related to Presbyterianism) dominated in New England, except for 
Rhode Island, which lacked an official religion.  The Congregationalist Church was not disestablished until 
1818 in Connecticut, 1819 in New Hampshire, and in two parts—in 1824 and 1833—in Massachusetts.  
The prohibition against establishment of an official religion, a part of the Bill of Rights, was not applied to 
state governments until the extension of the equal-protection clause of the 14
th Amendment to state 
governments starting in the late 1800s.  This extension culminated in a Supreme Court decision in 1934.  
For discussions, see Norman (1968, chs. 1 and 2), Finke and Stark (1992, ch. 3), and Olds (1994).   7
represents less of a restriction on religious expression than in other countries—say Iran.  
We could extend our analysis to consider the relation between government and religion 
as a continuum, and we could examine a variety of forms of interaction between 
government and religion.  In an ongoing project, Fox and Sandler (2004) are assembling 
a Religion and State data base.  They classify the relation between religion and state in 
numerous categories, which are arranged into four broad groupings:  separation of 
religion and state, discrimination against minority religions, restrictions on majority 
religions, and religious legislation.  Although each individual measure is a (0,1) dummy 
variable, indexes based on the large number of individual components would be nearly 
continuous.  The Fox-Sandler data will eventually be available for most countries back to 
1960 but are presently available only since 1990.  We plan to use their data eventually to 
investigate more aspects of the interaction between government and religion. 
  Our study covers 188 countries that were independent in 2000.
3  The 188 
represent the countries for which we have data on state religion and other relevant 
variables.  Among these 188, 40%—75 countries—are classified as having state religions 
in 2000.  Going back in time, 39% of 189 countries—73—had state religions in 1970, 
and 59% of 188—111—had state religions in 1900.
4  Thus, the crude data for the 20
th 
century indicate a downward trend in state religion in the first part of the century but no 
trend over the last 30 years. 
                                                 
3 The criterion of legal independence in 2000 excludes, for example, Bermuda, Hong Kong, and Macao. 
4 The 189 countries in 1970 include East and West Germany as separate entities.  Many of the 188 
independent countries that existed in 2000 were not independent in 1970 and, even more so, in 1900.  For 
countries that were not independent in 1970 or 1900, the designation of state religion pertains to the regime 
applying to the comparable region.  Some of these regions were colonies—for example, in Africa—and 
others were parts of larger countries—for example, republics of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia in 1970 or 
pieces of the Ottoman Empire in 1900.   8
  Our classifications of state religion come primarily from Barrett (1982, pp. 800-
801) and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001, pp. 834-835).
5  These sources have the 
advantage of providing global coverage over time on a reasonably consistent basis.  
Although the designations are influenced by a country’s legal provisions, including 
statements about religion in constitutions, the concept employed is ultimately de facto. 
The classifications are clearer in some cases than others.  In some of the straightforward 
situations, the constitution designates an official state church and restricts or prohibits 
other forms of religion.  However, even without these designations or prohibitions, the 
government may systematically favor a specified religion through subsidies and tax 
collections or through the teaching of religion in public schools.  These considerations 
caused Barrett, et al to classify some countries as having a “state religion,” despite the 
absence of an official state church in the constitution.  Controversial cases of this type in 
2000 include Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which Barrett, et al deem to have a Catholic state 
religion.  We consider later whether our results are sensitive to changes in designations 
for these cases. 
  Barrett (1982) and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) classify some 
governments as favoring multiple religions or religion in general, although not 
maintaining a single religion.  Examples in 2000 are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cyprus, 
Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland.  These countries lack a state religion in the 
                                                 
5 We corrected a number of typos in the designations in Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001).  We also 
updated for two recent events:  Sweden dropping Lutheranism as the state religion in 2000 and Bulgaria 
adopting Orthodoxy as the state religion in 2001.  Finally, in accordance with the U.S. State Department 
Survey of Religious Freedom and other sources, we classified Cambodia as having a state religion 
(Buddhist) in 2000.  The discussion in Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001, p. 165) reveals that events after 
1975 in Cambodia were not taken into account, including the reestablishment of a Buddhist state religion in 
1989.   9
sense of having or favoring a monopoly religion.  Therefore, we classified these countries 
as not having a state religion.
6 
  Tables 1a-1g describe the data on state religion.  The tables are organized to 
facilitate thinking about changes in the status of state religion since 1900.  In terms of 
transitions, the 188 countries in 2000 break down into seven types.  Table 1a shows the 
72 countries that maintained no form of state religion throughout, that is, in 1900, 1970, 
and 2000.  Examples are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, and the United 
States.
7 
  Table 1b shows the 58 countries that had a state religion at all three dates: 1900, 
1970, and 2000.
8  (Each of these countries maintained only one type of state religion at 
the three dates.)  Among these, 21 had Catholic state religions, 22 had Muslim, 9 had 
Protestant (where we include Anglican with Protestant), 1 had Orthodox, 4 had Buddhist, 
and 1 had Hindu. 
  The remaining 58 countries had some kind of transition between the presence and 
absence of state religion from 1900 to 2000.  (Among these, 12 countries had two 
transitions.)  Table 1c shows the 29 countries with state religions in 1900 that abandoned 
state religion by 1970 and did not reinstitute state religion by 2000.  Examples are Brazil 
and Chile (which dropped the Catholic state church), Turkey (Muslim), Indonesia (which 
dropped the Dutch Reformed Church that had been imposed by the former colonial ruler), 
                                                 
6 In 1993, the new Guatemalan constitution recognized indigenous and Protestant religions, in addition to 
the Catholic religion.  However, we followed Barrett, et al (2001) in labeling Guatemala as having a state 
religion (Catholic) in 2000. 
7 The French republic separated completely from the Catholic Church in 1905.  However, under the Third 
Republic, which started in 1871, there was a gradual movement toward universal and secular education.  
Probably for this reason, Barrett, et al label France as not officially Catholic in 1900.  
8 We have not investigated in detail whether lapses in state religion occurred in these countries at other 
dates in the 20
th century.  Two cases that we know of are Afghanistan lacking a state religion from the time 
of the Marxist coup in 1978 until the rise of the Taliban in the mid 1990s and Cambodia lacking a state 
religion from the rise of Communism in the mid 1970s until 1989.   10
Russia (Orthodox), Japan (Shinto, a form of Buddhism), and China and Korea 
(Confucianism).  Table 1d shows the 12 countries with state religion in 1900 that 
abandoned state religion between 1970 and 2000.  This group includes Ireland (which 
dropped Catholic
9), Syria (Muslim), and Sweden (Protestant). 
  Table 1e shows 12 countries that had a state religion in 1900, dropped the state 
religion by 1970, but then reinstated a state religion by 2000.  These cases are all former 
republics of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia.  Four Asian countries that were previously 
parts of the Soviet Union had Orthodox state religions in 1900 (as parts of the Russian 
empire) but adopted Muslim state religions by 2000.  Five other former Soviet republics, 
including Armenia and Ukraine, reinstated an Orthodox state religion by 2000.  Croatia is 
designated as having a Catholic state religion in 1900 and 2000 but no state religion, as 
part of Yugoslavia, in 1970. 
  Finally, Tables 1f and 1g show countries that had no state religion in 1900 but 
introduced one by 1970 (3 cases) or 2000 (2 cases).  The three countries that adopted by 
1970 were not independent entities in 1900:  Bangladesh
10 and Pakistan, which instituted 
a Muslim state religion, and Israel, which adopted a Jewish state religion.  The two 
countries that adopted between 1970 and 2000 are Vanuatu, which introduced a 
Protestant state religion upon independence in 1979, and Bulgaria, which established the 
Orthodox Church (in 2001, rather than 2000).
11 
                                                 
9 Our classification follows Barrett, et al’s designation of Ireland as having a Catholic state church in 1900 
and 1970.  However, the official status of the Catholic Church in Ireland, such as it was, was not 
established until after Irish independence in 1921.  Moreover, the Anglican Church was disestablished in 
Ireland in 1869.  Therefore, it might be preferable to treat Ireland as lacking a state religion in 1900 and 
having one in 1970.  A 1972 referendum eliminated the Catholic Church’s official status. 
10 Bangladesh lacked a state religion from the time of its independence from Pakistan in 1972 until the 
military coup of 1975. 
11 Barrett, et al classify Bulgaria as not having an Orthodox state religion in 1900, when the country was 
subject to competing influences from the Russian and Ottoman empires.  If Bulgaria were classified instead   11
 
II.  Conceptual Issues 
  The decision to implement or maintain a state religion involves interactions 
between the government and the religion sector.  Part of this interaction involves the 
degree of separation between church and state—in some countries with state religions, 
church and state are inseparable.   
  Our general perspective is that a state religion is more likely to exist when the net 
benefits to the state and the potential monopoly religion are greater.  We describe in 
subsequent paragraphs a number of factors that influence this net benefit.  However, 
given these factors, we assume that the mere existence of a state religion makes it more 
likely that the state religion will continue into the future.  In this sense, state religion is 
like other political and legal institutions.  Changing any of these institutions requires the 
reaching of a political consensus or the application of a strong force from the central 
political authority.  Typically, the maintenance of the status quo is the option of lowest 
cost and, hence, highest net benefit.  In our context, we find that this force remains 
important over a 100-year horizon. 
  Although institutional changes are costly, a change in any one feature—such as 
the implementation or removal of a state religion—is easier when other regime changes 
are already taking place.  For example, for a former colony, independence entails the 
creation of a new form of government, which typically involves the enactment of a 
constitution and other aspects of a legal system.  At such times, changes in the status of 
state religion are also likely to occur.  Similarly, when a large country breaks apart—such 
                                                                                                                                                 
as having a state religion (Orthodox) in 1900, the country would fall into Table 1e—in this case, an eastern 
European country that dropped a state religion under Soviet influence and then reintroduced it when the 
Soviet Union collapsed.   12
as the disintegrations of the Ottoman Empire, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia—the 
newly independent states can readily change the legal treatment of religion. 
  To capture this force, we classified countries in 1970 and 2000 as to whether they 
had experienced at least one major regime change since 1900.  The question of what 
constitutes a major regime change is subjective.  However, to enhance our objectivity, we 
labeled as a major regime change only an occurrence of one of the following three 
events:  a transition from colonial status to independence, a split-off of part of a larger 
country into a separate state, and the adoption or elimination of Communism.  Based on 
these criteria, our classification for 1970 has 113 of 189 countries or 60% with at least 
one major regime change since 1900.  In 2000, 136 of 188 countries or 72% had 
experienced such a change.  Most of our classifications of major regime changes are 
straightforward but some are not.  For example, we do not label as major regime changes 
war-related occupations of countries and the associated post-war shifts in governing 
institutions.  Debatable classifications of this type include Japan, South Korea, and 
Turkey, each of which we classify as having no major regime change since 1900.  We 
explore later how our results change if we shift the classifications for these cases. 
  One important influence on the net benefit from state religion is the degree of 
homogeneity of the population with respect to religious adherence.  Gill (2002) argues 
that, in a pluralistic setting, all religion providers will favor a framework that allows for 
free entry into the religion market.  We measure homogeneity of religious adherence by 
standard measures of concentration—Herfindahl indexes for adherence shares in 1900, 
1970, and 2000.  These indexes—the sum of the squares of the population shares among 
11 groups—can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected persons   13
belong to the same religion.
12  The maintenance of religious monopoly—notably the 
deterrence of entry by outside groups—is less costly when more of the population 
adheres to the monopoly faith.  More generally, homogeneity of the population with 
respect to other characteristics, such as ethnicity and language, might help to install a 
monopoly religion. 
  An important issue for the empirical analysis is that state religion and the 
structure of religious adherence may have a two-way interaction.  More homogeneity 
promotes state religion, but state religion likely promotes concentration of religious 
adherence in the monopoly faith.  As an attempt to sort out these interactions, we use 
variables from 1900 as instruments for the concentration of religion in 1970 and 2000.     
  Governments may use the absence or presence of state religion as a way to control 
the religion sector.  Important examples are Communist governments, some of which 
promoted “scientific atheism” as an alternative to usual forms of organized religion.
13  
The anti-religious nature of Communist regimes is so powerful that our sample has only 
one example of a Communist government that maintained a state religion—Somalia with 
a Muslim state religion in 1970.
14  Our analysis treats the presence of a Communist 
                                                 
12 The data on religious adherence are from Barrett (1982) and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001).  We 
use the breakdown:  Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, other Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, other 
Eastern religions, Jewish, other religions, and non-religious.  The last category includes atheists and 
persons professing no religion.  This classification differs from the one used in our prior work by the 
inclusion of the non-religion group and by the addition of the category for other Christians (which includes 
adherents to independent Christian churches, marginal Christians, such as Mormons and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, and unaffiliated Christians).  Barrett, et al do not provide a breakdown of Muslim or Buddhist 
adherence by type. 
13 For a discussion of the promotion of atheism under Communism, especially in East Germany, see Froese 
and Pfaff (2003). 
14In 2000, we classed 5 of the 188 countries as having Communist regimes, based on the descriptions of 
governmental systems in CIA World Fact Book.  The five are China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and 
Vietnam.  (North Korea is actually classed as “authoritarian socialist, one-man dictatorship.”)  In 1970, we 
used Kornai’s list (1992, Table 1.1) to classify 35 of 189 countries (separating Germany into East and 
West) as having Communist governments.  Many of the Communist “countries” in 1970 were parts of 
larger states (republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) or were Eastern European countries that were   14
government as exogenous to the religion market—that is, we view the relation between 
Communism and state religion as causation from the former to the latter.  In addition to 
examining the contemporaneous effect, we investigate whether Communist governments 
have a lasting influence that persists after the Communist regime has ended. 
  Some religions may have more to gain than others from the imposition of a state 
religion.  Notably, a religion that regards its own faith as essential for salvation is more 
likely to press for a state religion as a way to suppress “inappropriate” worship by other 
religions.  Stark (2001, 2003) argues that this outlook on salvation applies especially to 
the three great monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam:  “Those who 
believe there is only One True God are offended by worship directed toward other Gods.”  
(Stark [2003, p. 32]).  He argues accordingly that these monotheisms have the most to 
gain by allying with the state to secure a religious monopoly.  In our empirical analysis of 
state religion in 1970 and 2000, we find some evidence for a positive effect from Muslim 
adherence.  Catholic and Protestant religions may have had similar influences at earlier 
times, but these effects do not show up in the data for the 20
th century. 
  In 1900, much of sub-Saharan Africa represented reasonably open territory in 
which the major world religions could compete for influence.  For unweighted averages 
of 48 sub-Saharan African countries that existed in 2000, the fraction of the adhering 
population professing the Catholic religion rose from 0.06 in 1900 to 0.23 in 2000, the 
fraction Protestant or other Christian rose from 0.03 to 0.26, the fraction Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                 
heavily influenced by the Soviet Union.  Also classed as Communist were China, Congo (Brazzaville), 
Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Somalia.  Since our data for Vietnam are not separated 
into North and South, we entered the Communism dummy for Vietnam in 1970 as one-half, corresponding 
to the roughly equal breakdown of the population between North and South.  South Yemen was also 
Communist in 1970, but our data for 1970 refer only to non-Communist North Yemen (roughly 80% of the 
combined population of Yemen).  Our data for Communism in 1955 also come from Kornai’s list, and our 
data for Communism in 1985 come from CIA World Fact Book and individual country sources.   15
increased from 0.20 to 0.30, and the fraction associated with indigenous and other 
religions fell from 0.69 to 0.16.
15  Thus, especially for the Christian religions, the main 
religious conversions in Africa occurred in the 20
th century.  This potential for conversion 
should have created opportunities for establishments of state religions.  However, in 
contrast with the Americas in the 1500s and 1600s, the strong competition among the 
major world faiths in sub-Saharan Africa may have impeded the implementation of 
legally supported monopoly religions.  Our analysis would pick up this effect from the 
inclusion of a measure of religious concentration.  However, a separate dummy variable 
for sub-Saharan Africa turns out also to have a negative influence on the likelihood of 
state religion. 
  An important issue for evaluating our previous analysis of economic growth is 
whether the level of economic development, represented by per capita real GDP, 
influences the probability of having a state religion.  The secularization hypothesis posits 
that an increase in per capita GDP lowers the demand for organized religion.  If this 
hypothesis is correct, then an increase in per capita GDP likely lowers the net benefits to 
a potential monopoly religion from having a state religion.  Therefore, this view predicts 
that an increase in per capita GDP would lower the probability of having a state religion.  
We find little support for this hypothesis. 
  A country’s prior colonial status may matter for state religion.  Woodberry (2003) 
argues that missionaries were especially important in influencing educational systems 
and, thereby, affecting future political systems, including the extent of democracy.  Along 
similar lines, we might predict that former colonies of Britain would be likely to have a 
                                                 
15 These numbers do not include the fraction Orthodox, which rose from 0.01 in 1900 to 0.02 in 2000.  The 
data on religious adherence shares are discussed in n.12.   16
Protestant state religion, whereas former colonies of France, Spain, and Portugal would 
be likely to have a Catholic state religion.  Our empirical findings show no overall 
difference between colonies and non-colonies in the propensity to have a state religion.  
However, British colonies are more likely than Spanish or Portuguese countries to have a 
state religion.   
  La Porta, et al (1988) argue that continuing effects from former colonial rulers 
often work through legal systems—for example, former British colonies having common-
law systems and former colonies of France, Spain, and Portugal having statute-law 
systems.  Categorizations of countries by former colonial status are similar to but not 
identical to classifications by legal systems.  For example, Thailand and Bhutan are 
classified as non-colonies but have British style common-law systems; Iran is classed as a 
non-colony but has a French style statute-law regime; and Egypt, Iraq, Malta, and 
Mauritius are classified as former British colonies but have French style statute-law 
systems.  We lack a theoretical argument for why common-law versus statute-law 
arrangements would relate to the choice of state religion, and the empirical results do not 
show an effect that can be distinguished from colonial history more generally. 
  The choice of a state religion can be viewed as one form of limitation on 
individual freedom.  From this perspective, we might expect the presence of state religion 
to relate to other dimensions of democracy and legal structure.  On the other hand, a 
casual view of the data indicates that weakening or elimination of state religion is 
sometimes a part of broad liberal reform but at other times is the work of a dictator 
(notably in Communist governments).  Consistent with these opposing forces, our   17
empirical analysis does not show a clear relation of state religion to indicators of 
democracy, civil liberties, and the rule of law. 
  We can also think of state religion as a particular form of market regulation.  
Mulligan and Shleifer (2004) model the choice of regulation in a political-economy 
setting.  Given fixed costs of regulating, they argue that larger jurisdictions tend to have 
more regulation.  An extrapolation of the Mulligan-Shleifer idea to our setting would 
predict that larger countries would be more likely to have state religions.  We find no 
supporting evidence for this hypothesis. 
 
III.  Empirical Findings 
  Our empirical analysis focuses on linear probability models for the presence of 
state religion.  The obvious problem with these linear specifications is that the fitted 
values for explaining state religion need not lie in the interval (0, 1), as would be true for 
a probability.  This problem can be handled by a binary-model specification, such as the 
probit form that we consider later.  The results from probit estimation are similar to those 
for the linear model.  Since the linear models are more tractable, especially for imposing 
theory-based restrictions on coefficients and for assessing causation, we focus on these 
results. 
  
  A.  Estimates of Linear Probability Models with no Allowance for 
Endogeneity 
  Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the 
analysis.  Table 3 has estimates of the linear probability models.  The first set of results   18
neglects the potential endogeneity of some of the right-hand side variables.  These results 
are labeled as SUR (for seemingly-unrelated regression model) in the table.  Another set 
of results takes account of possible endogeneity of some of the right-hand side variables.  
These results are labeled as 3SLS (for three-stage least-squares).  We consider the 3SLS 
results in the next section. 
  The dependent variable is a (0, 1) dummy for the presence of a state religion in 
2000 or 1970.  Thus, we investigate only whether a state religion exists, not the particular 
form of state religion.  The reasoning for the inclusion of the various explanatory 
variables has already been presented.  Column 1 of Table 3 includes a dummy variable 
for the presence of state religion in 1900, the Herfindahl index for concentration of 
religion in 2000 or 1970, the presence of a Communist regime (for 2000 and 1985 in the 
2000 equation, for 1970 and 1955 in the 1970 equation), the fraction of the population 
that is Muslim in 2000 or 1970, and a dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa. 
  We use a specification that allows for persistence of state religion over time but 
that distinguishes countries with at least one major regime change from those without 
such a change.  Let St be a zero-one dummy variable for the presence of state religion for 
a country in year t.  Let Rt be a (0, 1) dummy variable for whether the country has 
experienced at least one major regime change since 1900.  The specification of the 
deterministic part of our linear probability model is then 
  (1)     St = S1900·[λ1·(1-Rt) + λ2·Rt] + [1 - λ1·(1-Rt) - λ2·Rt]·βZt + constant, 
where S1900 is a dummy variable for the presence of state religion in 1900, the 
coefficients λ1 and λ2 (0<λ1<1 and 0<λ2<1) determine the persistence over time in the 
probability of state religion for countries without and with regime changes, respectively   19
(Rt = 0 or Rt = 1), and βZt represents the long-run influence of a set of explanatory 
variables, Zt, on the probability of state religion.  The vector Zt includes the concentration 
index for religious adherence in year t, the presence of Communism in year t and in the 
past, and so on. 
 The  coefficients  λ1 and λ2 would differ depending on whether St is observed in 
2000 or 1970.  Since 100 years have elapsed since 1900 in 2000 and only 70 years in 
1970, we anticipate that λ1 and λ2 would each be higher in 1970 than in 2000.  That is, 
more of the persisting influence from the status of state religion in 1900 would remain in 
1970.  In any event, we estimate one pair of coefficients, (λ1, λ2), for 2000 and another 
pair for 1970.     
  The other coefficients, given by β in equation (1), represent the long-run effects of 
the variables Zt on the probability of state religion.  Hence, the coefficients β should be 
the same in the equations for 2000 and 1970.  We therefore carry out the estimation under 
the restriction that these coefficients are the same for the two years.  The imposition of 
these restrictions sharpens the precision of our estimates.  We can also test the hypothesis 
of equality for the coefficients β in 2000 and 1970.  These tests reveal that the data accord 
with the hypothesis of equality. 
  Consider first the results in Table 3, column 1.  This SUR estimation treats the 
equations for state religion in 2000 and 1970 as a system, where the error terms for each 
country are allowed to be correlated over time.  However, as mentioned, this method 
makes no allowance for endogeneity of any of the right-hand-side variables.  (The 
method also weighs countries the same, independently of size, geographical proximity to 
other countries, and so on.)   20
  Given the other explanatory variables, the existence of a state religion in 1900 
matters a great deal for the probability of state religion in 2000 and 1970.  For a country 
that has experienced no major regime change since 1900, the estimated coefficients are 
0.75 for 2000 and 0.91 for 1970.  These coefficients are each statistically significantly 
different from zero with p-values less than 0.01.
16  The coefficient in the 1970 equation is 
higher than that for 2000 with a p-value for the difference of 0.025.
17  This result makes 
sense because it signifies that less of the effect from the initial condition in 1900 would 
have decayed by 1970 than by 2000. 
  For a country with at least one major regime change, the coefficients on the 
dummy variable for state religion in 1900 are 0.31 for 2000 and 0.28 for 1970.  These 
coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero with p-values less than 
0.01.
18  Each coefficient is significantly lower, with p-values less than 0.01, than its 
counterpart for countries with no major regime change (point estimates of 0.75 and 0.91, 
respectively).  That is, as expected, the status of state religion in 1900 is substantially 
more important for countries with no major regime change than for those with such a 
change.  Among countries with regime changes, we would have expected a smaller 
coefficient for 2000, but the two coefficients (0.31 and 0.28) do not differ statistically 
from each other.  This outcome may signify that, for countries with regime changes, the 
most important influence on the probability of state religion is the fact of such a change 
(interacted with the other explanatory variables), rather than the time elapsed since 1900. 
                                                 
16 Using a one-sided Wald test, each coefficient is also significantly less than one (p-value of 0.002 for 
2000 and 0.043 for 1970).  However, it may be more appropriate to test for unit coefficients by using some 
variant of a unit-root test.   
17 This result applies for a Wald test of equal coefficients against the alternative hypothesis that the 
coefficient for 1970 is larger than that for 2000 (that is, a one-sided test). 
18 These coefficients are also significantly less than one.   21
  For countries with no major regime change, we can view the estimated 
coefficients on the 1900 value for the state-religion dummy variable as gauging the rate at 
which the historical presence of state religion becomes unimportant for the current 
environment.  The values of 0.906 for 1970 and 0.748 for 2000 (column 1 of Table 3) 
imply decay rates of 0.14% and 0.29% per year, respectively. 
  The results can be extrapolated to the very long-term evolution of state religion.  
If we assume a decay rate of 0.2% per year, the probability of observing state religion in 
2000 would depend on the presence of state religion at the time of the Reformation—say, 
470 years earlier—with a coefficient of 0.39.  Thus, the establishments around 1530 of 
the Lutheran Church in Scandinavia and the Anglican Church in England would still 
matter substantially for the likely character of current state religion.  An even earlier 
event—the Great Schism between the western (Rome) and eastern (Constantinople) 
branches of the Catholic Church in 1054— would matter in 2000 with a coefficient 
of 0.15.   
  One important caveat for these calculations is that the changes during the 
Reformation and the Great Schism refer to shifts in the forms of state religion, rather than 
movements from state religion to no state religion.  It may be that the probability of 
eliminating state religion entirely was close to zero for a long time in the years before the 
20
th century.  Another point is that the calculations apply only to countries that do not 
experience major regime changes.  If changes occur to the basic form of government 
(which could itself be modeled probabilistically), the influence from the presence of state 
religion in the long ago past would be negligible.   22
  As mentioned, we can think of the coefficients on the other explanatory variables 
in column 1 of Table 3 as representing effects on the long-run probability of a state 
religion in a country, independent of the situation in 1900.  Religion concentration, 
gauged by the Herfindahl index, has a statistically significant, positive coefficient.
19  The 
point estimate of 0.71 means that a one-standard-deviation increase in concentration (by 
0.23 in 2000, see Table 2) raises the probability of state religion by 0.16.  This 
interpretation assumes that the estimated coefficient reveals the influence from religion 
concentration to the probability of state religion.  In the three-stage least-squares systems, 
we allow for reverse causation from state religion to religion concentration. 
  The contemporaneous presence of a Communist government has a statistically 
significant, negative effect on the probability of a state religion.  The presence of 
Communism is estimated to reduce the probability of state religion by 0.49.  We should 
note that, in 2000, our sample has 5 of the 188 countries designated as Communist and, in 
1970, 34 of the 189 countries, plus one-half of Vietnam, classified as Communist.  The 
only one of these countries that had a state religion contemporaneously with Communism 
was Somalia in 1970.
20 
  We also estimated lagged effects of Communism by entering a dummy variable 
for Communism in 1985 in the 2000 equation and for 1955 in the 1970 equation.
21  The 
                                                 
19 We also added measures of concentration of the population by ethnicity and language, as constructed by 
Alesina, et al (2003), to the specification in Table 3, column 1.  The ethnicity variable has a coefficient that 
is negative (the wrong sign) and marginally significant: -0.30 (s.e. = 0.15).  The language variable (added 
separately from ethnicity) is not statistically significant; the coefficient is -0.02 (0.14).  In each case, the 
coefficient on religion concentration remains positive and statistically significant. 
20 The autocrat Siad Barre, who came to power in 1969, argued that his brand of socialism was consistent 
with Islam.  Thus, initially, there were no changes in the official status of Islam.  However, in the pursuit of 
“scientific socialism” in the 1970s, Siad Barre moved increasingly to weaken the political influence of 
religious leaders.  
21 In this analysis, the 1985 value of the Communism dummy for unified Germany is set to 0.20, the 
population share of the eastern parts.   23
results in column 1 indicate a significantly negative effect, -0.17, from the presence of 
Communism 15 years earlier.  However, the significance of this coefficient is not robust 
to changes in specification that we consider later.  The principal finding is that the 
presence of Communism sharply lowers the contemporaneous probability of state 
religion but has relatively little influence once Communism is eliminated.  The main 
changes over time in the Communism variable come from the 28 countries in 2000 that 
were no longer Communist because of the collapses in the 1990s of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia.  Thus, our results imply that the history of Communism in these places did 
not have much lasting influence on the probability of state religion. 
  The Muslim religion adherence share has a coefficient, 0.37, that is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
22  However, as with lagged Communism, the 
significance of this coefficient turns out not to be robust to changes in specification that 
we consider later.  If we add the Catholic religion share, the coefficient of this variable is 
statistically insignificant from zero.  If we go further to include the shares for the other 
main monotheistic faiths—Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish—the only statistically 
significant coefficient is a positive and marginally significant one for the Jewish share.  
This result is driven by the presence of a state religion in Israel. 
  The dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa has a coefficient, -0.48, that is 
negative and statistically significant.  Thus, even after holding constant the measure of 
religion concentration, presence in sub-Saharan Africa is associated with a lower 
probability of state religion.  One possible reason for the significance of the Africa 
dummy is that the data on religious adherence, which underlie the construction of the 
                                                 
22 Fox and Sandler (2004, p. 12) observe from simple correlations that predominantly Muslim countries are 
particularly likely to have state religions.   24
religion concentration variable, are particularly subject to measurement error in this 
region.
23  Hence, the dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa may enter significantly 
because it goes beyond the religion concentration variable in signaling relatively low 
concentration of religious adherence in Africa. 
  We carried out the estimation for Table 3, column 1, under the restriction that the 
coefficients of a set of explanatory variables in the 2000 equation were the same as those 
in the 1970 equation.  This set of variables comprises religion concentration, 
contemporaneous and lagged Communism, the Muslim adherence share, the dummy 
variable for sub-Saharan Africa, and constant terms.  A joint test for equality of these 
coefficients is accepted with a p-value of 0.17.
24  Thus, this test validates the model’s 
hypothesis—that the coefficients β in equation (1) are the same in 2000 and 1970—and 
justifies our imposition of these restrictions for the estimates presented in Table 3. 
  Column 3 of Table 3 is the same as column 1, except that we add as an 
explanatory variable a measure of the state of economic development—the log of real per 
capita GDP.  The basic data on GDP are the purchasing-power adjusted numbers from 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  We entered the 1995 values, rather than those for 
2000, in the equation for 2000 in order to increase the number of observations.  
Nevertheless, the necessity of having data on real GDP results in a serious loss of 
observations—40 countries in 2000 and 74 countries in 1970.  Moreover, the selection of 
which countries lack GDP data is not random—for example, only 5 of the 35 countries 
designated as Communist in 1970 have GDP data for 1970. 
                                                 
23 This interpretation is supported by the discussions of data sources for African countries in Barrett 
(1982)—see, for example, the discussion for Nigeria on p. 527.  Lack of census information, especially 
outside of the major cities, is an important problem. 
24 The main differences in the estimated coefficients for 2000 and 1970 are for the Communism variables, 
contemporaneous and lagged.   25
  Since the main idea is to introduce an indicator of the state of economic 
development, we used information on life expectancy at birth and some other variables to 
construct proxies for real per capita GDP for the countries that lacked GDP data.  
Specifically, we used fitted values derived from regressions of the log of per capita GDP 
on the following variables:  the contemporaneous log of life expectancy at birth, two 
geography measures—the absolute value of degrees latitude and a dummy for land-
locked status—dummy variables for Communism, and the contemporaneous share of 
Muslim adherence.  The R-squared values for these regressions are reasonably high—
0.79 in 1995 and 0.70 in 1970—and we think that the resulting fitted values serve 
adequately as proxies for the standard of living.
25 
  The coefficient for the log of per capita GDP in column 3 of Table 3 is negative, 
-0.040, but is not quite statistically significant at the 5% level.
26  Thus, we find only weak 
support for the secularization view, which predicts a negative effect of economic 
development on the likelihood of state religion.
27  This interpretation views the 
coefficient on the log of per capita GDP as an influence from per capita GDP to the 
probability of state religion.  In the three-stage least-squares systems, we allow for 
reverse causation from state religion to per capita GDP. 
  The probability of state religion is unrelated to country size.  If we add the log of 
population to the equations for 2000 and 1970, the estimated coefficient differs 
insignificantly from zero.  For example, for the specification that includes the log of per 
                                                 
25 Life expectancy has the most explanatory power in these regressions (positive).  However, absolute 
degrees latitude is also important (positive), as is Communism in 1970 (negative).  Muslim adherence has 
substantial explanatory power for 1995 per capita GDP (negative). 
26 Measurement error in the GDP variable would tend to bias the estimated coefficient toward zero.  
However, this consideration should be less important for the three-stage least-squares estimate, which we 
consider later. 
27 In McCleary and Barro (2003), we did find statistically significant negative effects of per capita GDP on 
religiousness, as gauged by church attendance and religious beliefs.   26
capita GDP—Table 3, column 3—the estimated coefficient on the log of population is 
0.002, s.e. = 0.016.  Thus, the size effect predicted by Mulligan and Shleifer (2004) does 
not operate for state religion. 
  We considered influences from prior colonial status by using a breakdown into 
British, French, Spanish or Portuguese, and other colonies.
28  We carried out this analysis 
as a supplement to the specification in Table 3, column 3, which includes the log of per 
capita GDP.  If we consider all colonies as a group versus non-colonies, the estimated 
coefficient on the colony dummy variable differs insignificantly from zero (0.09, 
s.e. = 0.13, using the SUR technique).  Column 5 of Table 3 shows the results when the 
colonies are broken down into the four types—British, French, Spanish or Portuguese, 
and others.  In this case, none of the individual coefficients are statistically significantly 
different from zero.  However, the four dummy variables are jointly significant 
(p-value = 0.022).  The main effect picked up here is that the point estimate for British 
colonies is positive (in comparison with the left-out category of non-colonies), whereas 
that for Spanish and Portuguese colonies is negative.  In other words, British colonies are 
more likely than Spanish or Portuguese colonies to have state religions.  This pattern was 
not obvious, ex ante. 
  To see whether the colonial influences worked through legal origins, we used the 
legal-origins variable developed by La Porta, et al (1998).  We added dummy variables 
for British (common-law) and French (statute-law) legal systems to the specification in 
                                                 
28 Countries that were contemporaneously or formerly dependent on the Soviet Union, such as those in 
Eastern Europe, are not treated as current or former colonies.  Similarly, contemporaneous or former 
republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are not classed as current or former colonies.   27
Table 3, column 3.
29  Neither of these legal-origins variables is individually statistically 
significant, but the two are jointly significant (p-value = 0.007).  If we also include 
colony dummies, as in column 5 of Table 3, the two legal-origins variables are no longer 
jointly statistically significant (p-value = 0.15).  However, when we include the two 
legal-origins variables, the four colony dummy variables are also not jointly statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.28).  Thus, the data do not allow us to distinguish the effects from 
legal origins from those of colonial history more generally. 
  We examined the relationship of state religion to indicators of democracy, civil 
liberties, and the rule of law.  We used the Freedom House measures of democracy 
(electoral rights) and civil liberties for 1972, the first year of availability.  We used the 
rule-of-law indicator from Political Risk Services (from their International Country Risk 
Guide) for 1985, the first year of broad availability.  The result is that all of these 
variables, when added one at a time to the equations that include the log of per capita 
GDP (column 3 of Table 3), have statistically insignificant coefficients.  Thus, we find no 
evidence that the political forces that generate state religion are related to the forces that 
promote democracy and the rule of law.
30 
  We mentioned that some of the designations of state religions by Barrett (1982) 
and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) are controversial.  Three noteworthy cases are 
Spain, Portugal, and Italy, which Barrett, et al classify as having Catholic state religions 
in 2000 (as well as in 1970 and 1900).   
                                                 
29 The three omitted categories are German, Scandinavian, and socialist.  The socialist category is similar to 
our Communism variable. 
30 Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2003, Table 3) report a statistically significant negative relation 
between democracy and a measure of regulation of religion.  However, their results are hard to relate to 
ours because their measure of religious regulation is whether a state religion exists (as indicated by Barrett 
[1982] and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson [2001]) or whether a country is indicated by Barrett, et al to have 
lots of atheists.   28
  For Spain, movements away from the official status of the Catholic Church 
occurred after President Franco’s death in 1975—in particular, a 1978 referendum 
ratified a new constitution in which the state no longer was deemed to have an official 
religion.  Barrett, et al argue, however, that the situation remained one in which the 
Catholic Church had a special relationship with the government—they note, for example, 
that the constitution also says:  “The public authorities will keep in mind the religious 
beliefs of the Spanish society and will maintain cooperation with the Catholic Church and 
other confessions.”  Similarly, in Portugal, movements away from the monopoly status of 
the Catholic Church occurred after the death of President Salazar in 1969.  The monopoly 
position of the Church was weakened by the Law of Religious Liberty in 1971 and, even 
more so, by actions taken by the left-wing government that came to power with the coup 
in 1974.  Barrett, et al argue, however, that the prominent legal position of the Catholic 
Church was only modified, not eliminated.  Again in Italy, the official status of the 
Catholic Church was weakened in the 1970s by modifications of the concordat that had 
been in place since 1929.  However, Barrett, et al argue that the official position of the 
Catholic Church remained preeminent. 
  To see whether the results are sensitive to the classifications of state religion for 
Spain, Portugal, and Italy, we reran the system (Table 3, column 1) with the three 
designations changed to no state religion in 2000.  With this change, the fit worsens—the 
R-squared value for the 2000 equation falls from 0.56 to 0.51.  However, the coefficients 
do not change greatly from those found before.  The main change is that the coefficient 
on state religion in 1900 for countries in 2000 with no regime change falls from 0.748 
(s.e. = 0.086) to 0.659 (0.092).  Thus, our conclusion is that, although Barrett, et al’s   29
designations of state religion are controversial in some cases, the basic results are likely 
to be robust to reasonable changes in these designations. 
  We also mentioned that our classification of regime change was debatable in 
some cases—specifically, we were uncertain about the labeling of Japan, South Korea, 
and Turkey as having experienced no major regime change since 1900.  If we change the 
classifications of these three cases to having regime changes by 1970, our fitted model 
improves.  For the specification in column 1 of Table 3, the R-squared values rise from 
0.56 to 0.58 for the 2000 equation and from 0.73 to 0.76 for the 1970 equation.  The 
reason for the improvement in fits is that the three countries at issue had state religions in 
1900 but dropped them by 1970.  Thus, classifying these countries as having experienced 
a regime change makes it easier to fit the transitions in state religion.  Consistent with this 
perspective, the most notable change in the coefficients is an increase for the dummy 
variable for state religion in 1900 among countries with no regime change (to 0.797 
[0.082] for 2000 and 0.944 [0.054] for 1970). 
 
  B.  Three-Stage Least-Squares Estimates of Linear Probability Models 
  Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3 use instrumental variables (three-stage least 
squares or 3SLS) to deal with two-way causation between state religion and two of the 
explanatory variables:  religion concentration and the log of per capita GDP.  For religion 
concentration, our idea is to use information from 1900.  Essentially, the 3SLS systems 
relate the existence of state religion in 2000 and 1970 not to contemporaneous religion 
concentration but rather to the concentration that could have been predicted from the 
values of religion concentration that prevailed in 1900.   30
  To sort out directions of causation between state religion and religion 
concentration, the main issue in our context is whether the presence of state religion in 
1900 has predictive power for religion concentration in 2000 and 1970.  If so, reverse 
causation from state religion to religion concentration is likely to be important, and the 
SUR estimates shown in Table 3 would tend to be biased.  Since we use the 1900 value 
of religion concentration as an instrument, we also want to know whether this variable 
has substantial predictive power for religion concentration in 2000 and 1970.  If not, the 
instrument would be “weak” and would not give reliable results—see Staiger and Stock 
(1997). 
  To address these issues, we ran “first-stage” regressions with religion 
concentration in 2000 and 1970 as the dependent variables.  The explanatory variables 
were the values in 1900 for state religion and religion concentration, the 
contemporaneous Muslim adherence share,
31 and dummy variables for sub-Saharan 
Africa and Communism.  The state-religion variable for 1900 was interacted with the 
regime-change variable for 2000 or 1970.
32  Statistically significant variables for 
explaining religion concentration in 2000 or 1970 were the 1900 value of religion 
concentration (positive), the Muslim adherence share (positive), and the sub-Saharan 
African dummy (negative).  All of these coefficients had p-values less than 0.01.  For 
countries with regime changes, the status of state religion in 1900 had no predictive 
content.  However, for countries with no regime change, the coefficients on state religion 
in 1900 were positive and statistically significant—0.089 (s.e. = 0.037) for 2000 and 
                                                 
31 We also estimated systems in which the contemporaneous Muslim adherence share was treated as 
endogenous, with the 1900 Muslim adherence share taken as exogenous.  The 3SLS results for the linear 
probability models with this specification were very close to those reported in Table 3. 
32 We are treating regime change as exogenous with respect to religion concentration.   31
0.085 (0.033) for 1970.  Thus, there is some evidence that the past presence of state 
religion predicts concentration of religious adherence 70 or 100 years later.  This result 
suggests a possible simultaneity bias in the coefficients estimated by the SUR technique 
in Table 3.  We deal with this problem by using religion concentration in 1900 as an 
instrument for contemporaneous religion concentration—the high explanatory power for 
religion concentration in 1900 suggests that this instrument would not be weak. 
  Column 2 of Table 3 shows three-stage least-squares estimates of the linear 
probability model for state religion in 2000 and 1970.  The instrument lists exclude 
contemporaneous religion concentration but include the values for 1900.  The main 
differences from the previous results (shown in column 1) are in the coefficients for 
religion concentration and the Muslim adherence share.  Religion concentration is still 
positive and statistically significant—in fact, the coefficient is higher than before. 
Therefore, the allowance for endogeneity of religion concentration leaves intact the 
conclusion that greater concentration makes state religion more likely.  However, the 
coefficient for Muslim adherence becomes smaller and is no longer statistically 
significant.
33   Hence, the effect of Muslim adherence on the probability of state religion 
is not reliably determined—the results are sensitive to the estimation procedure. 
  Column 4 of Table 3 shows three-stage least-squares estimates for the model that 
includes the log of per capita GDP.  We now treat the log of per capita GDP, as well as 
religion concentration, as endogenous.  Since we lack data on per capita GDP in 1900 for 
                                                 
33 The result on religion concentration is surprising because, with a positive effect of state religion on 
religion concentration, the instrumental estimate of the concentration coefficient would tend to be smaller 
than the one estimated by SUR.  The reason the point estimate becomes larger seems to involve an 
interaction with the Muslim adherence variable.  For given religion concentration in 1900, Muslim 
adherence in 1970 or 2000 “predicts” higher contemporaneous religion concentration.  Therefore, the 
instrumental estimate of the concentration coefficient picks up a positive effect from Muslim adherence.  
When this effect is held constant, the estimated coefficient on the Muslim adherence variable becomes 
smaller.   32
most of the countries, we include instead as instruments two geographical features 
mentioned before that have substantial explanatory power for per capita GDP.  These 
features are the absolute value of degrees latitude and the dummy variable for land-
locked status.   
  To assess the first-stage equations for per capita GDP, we ran least-squares 
regressions with the log of per capita GDP in 1995 or 1970 as the dependent variable.  
The explanatory variables are the two geography measures, the 1900 values of state 
religion and religion concentration, the contemporaneous Muslim adherence share, and 
dummy variables for Communism and sub-Saharan Africa.  The result is that degrees 
latitude has positive coefficients that are significant with p-values less than 0.01, and 
landlocked-status has negative coefficients with p-values of 0.011 in the equation for 
1995 per capita GDP and 0.008 for 1970 per capita GDP.  Also significant in these 
equations are the sub-Saharan African dummy (negative with p-values less than 0.01), the 
Muslim adherence share (negative with p-values less than 0.01), and the dummy variable 
for Communism in 1970 (negative with p-values less than 0.01).  State religion from 
1900 is negative but only marginally significant.  One important finding is that the two 
geographical features have substantial explanatory power and would therefore not be 
weak instruments for the log of per capita GDP. 
  The three-stage least-squares estimate of the coefficient of the log of per capita 
GDP (Table 3, column 4) is -0.08, s.e. = 0.06.  Thus, as before (column 3), the effect of 
per capita GDP is not statistically significantly different from zero.
34  We conclude that 
                                                 
34 One concern is that, over long periods, the land-locked variable is endogenous because it reflects changes 
in country borders.  For example, Bolivia currently lacks access to the sea because it lost its coastline in a 
war with Chile in the late 1800s.  Moreover, this military defeat might somehow be related to Bolivia’s 
potential per capita GDP.  In any event, our results are similar if we drop the land-locked dummy variable   33
an allowance for the endogeneity of per capita GDP with respect to state religion does not 
change the basic finding.  We still lack evidence that increases in per capita GDP 
decrease the probability of state religion.
35 
  Column 6 of Table 3 shows three-stage least-squares estimates when the colony 
dummy variables are added to the equations from column 4.  (The colony dummy 
variables and their interactions with the regime-change variables are included in the 




  C.  Probit Estimates of Probability Models 
  Table 4 shows coefficient estimates for a probit model for the probability of state 
religion in 2000 and 1970.
37  This system parallels the linear probability model in 
column 1 of Table 3.  As before, the statistically significant coefficients in Table 4 are for 
state religion in 1900 (positive for countries without and with a regime change), religion 
concentration (positive), contemporaneous Communism (negative), and the sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy (negative).  The Muslim coefficient is positive but no longer statistically 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the instrument lists.  In this case, the estimated coefficient on the log of per capita GDP is -0.05, 
s.e. = 0.06. 
35 These results suggest that the dummy variable for the presence of state religion in 1970 was satisfactory 
as an instrumental variable for religiosity in our study of economic growth from 1965 to 1995 (Barro and 
McCleary [2003]). 
36 If we consider only colonies versus non-colonies, the coefficient on colony is again statistically 
insignificant from zero—the estimate is 0.06, s.e. = 0.14. 
37 See Wooldridge (2002, chapter 15) for a discussion of probit estimation.  We estimate the probit model 
by maximum likelihood, subject to coefficient restrictions implied by the latent model based on Eq. (1).  
Specifically, the probit coefficients on the independent variables Z (religion concentration, current and 
lagged Communism, Muslim adherence, sub-Saharan Africa dummy, and a constant) are the same for 2000 
and 1970.  In addition, in 2000 and 1970, the ratio of the probit coefficient on state religion in 1900 for no 
regime change to that for a regime change equals the ratio of the coefficients λ1 and λ2 applied to the 
independent variables Z.  We also allow the error terms for 2000 and 1970 to be correlated.   34
significant at the 5% level.  Lagged Communism has an insignificant effect, as before.
38  
  Much easier to interpret than the probit coefficients in Table 4 are the implied 
marginal effects of each right-hand-side variable on the probability of state religion.  
Because these models are non-linear, the marginal effects depend on the values of all of 
the independent variables and are, therefore, different for each country and year.  The 
values shown in column 2 give the sample average of the marginal effects for the 
continuous variables—religion concentration and Muslim adherence share.  For the 
dummy variables, the values give the sample average effect from a change in each 
dummy variable from 0 to 1.
39  In the main, the marginal effects shown in column 2 are 
close to the coefficients of the linear probability model shown in column 1 of Table 3.  
Hence, the linear probability models give a reasonable picture of the average marginal 
effects of each explanatory variable on the probability of state religion.   
  The pseudo R-squared values in Table 4 parallel usual R-squared measures—they 
equal one minus the ratio of the unexplained sum of squared residuals to the total sum of 
squared deviations of the dependent variable around its mean.  These values are 
comparable to the R-squared values shown for the linear probability model in column 1 
of Table 3.  The values in Table 4 are higher because the non-linear aspects of the probit 
improve on the fit.  Notably, the probit does not err by generating fitted values that are 
less than zero or greater than one. 
  Another common measure of goodness of fit for probit models is the fraction of 
observations correctly predicted by the model.  In this calculation, the model is deemed to 
                                                 
38 If we add the log of per capita GDP to the system, analogous to column 3 of Table 3, we again get a 
statistically insignificant coefficient:  -0.16, s.e. = 0.20. 
39 For state religion in 1900, the averaging is over the respective sub-samples:  2000 without and with a 
regime change and 1970 without and with a regime change.   35
be correct if an observation of no state religion matches up with a fitted probability less 
than 0.5 and if an observation of state religion matches up with a fitted probability greater 
than 0.5.  Otherwise, the model is deemed to be incorrect.  Column 1 of Table 4 shows 
that the probit model correctly predicts overall for 90% of the cases (339 of 377).  The 
breakdown is 86% correct in 2000 (162 of 188) and 94% correct in 1970 (177 of 189).  
The percentages correct are similar for cases where state religion is absent or present. 
  To get a more modest perspective on the fit, we can compare the probit model 
with a naïve model that says that the status of state religion in 1970 and 2000 is the same 
as that in 1900.  This model would have been correct for 142 of 188 cases or 76% in 2000 
and 145 of 189 cases or 77% in 1970.  If we add to the naïve model the proposition that 
Communist countries lack state religions, we would have been correct for 146 of 188 
cases or 78% in 2000 and 168 of 189 cases or 89% in 1970.
40  Thus, from Table 4, the 
rest of the probit model improves the prediction by 16 countries in 2000 and 9 countries 
in 1970. 
  We can list the countries that have the largest residuals in the probit equations.  
Two notable errors are for Turkey—the absence of state religion matches up with fitted 
probabilities of 0.90 in 1970 and 0.97 in 2000.
41  Turkey’s surprising status as a secular 
state may owe a lot to the individual influence of President Ataturk in the 1920s.  
Another large error is for Syria (0 in 2000, fitted of 0.99), which abandoned a Muslim 
state religion in 1973 under the new constitution instituted by President El-Assad.  Other 
large residuals are for Vanuatu (1 in 2000, fitted of 0.06), Bulgaria (1 in 2000, fitted of 
                                                 
40 For Somalia in 1970, the two naïve rules are inconsistent—the country had a state religion, as in 1900, 
but it was also Communist.  The calculation assumes that the naïve model incorrectly predicts Somalia. 
41 Note that the 2000 equation does not update for the status of state religion in 1970.  The 2000 equation 
considers only the status of state religion in 1900.   36
0.07), Brazil (0 in 1970, fitted of 0.89), Chile (0 in 1970, fitted of 0.89), Japan (0 in 1970, 
fitted of 0.89), South Korea (0 in 1970, fitted of 0.88), Ireland (0 in 2000, fitted of 0.86), 
Somalia (1 in 1970, fitted of 0.15), and Israel (1 in 2000, fitted of 0.17).  
 
IV.  Concluding Observations 
  We used a framework of political-institutional choice to assess the probability of 
the presence of state religion.  Our empirical application of this framework for 2000 and 
1970 shows that state religion is far more likely to exist when it existed in 1900.  
However, the persistence is much stronger for countries that have experienced no major 
change in political regime than for countries that have experienced such a change.  For 
countries with no major regime changes, the rate of decay is slow enough so that 
religious institutions from the distant past—such as those at the time of the Reformation 
in the1500s—would still matter substantially for the shape of present day institutions. 
  Communism has a strong negative effect on the probability of state religion—our 
sample contains only one Communist country (Somalia in 1970) with state religion in the 
usual sense.  However, past Communism has little influence on the probability of state 
religion. 
  Consistent with theoretical reasoning, a greater concentration of religious 
adherence is positively associated with state religion.  Our results indicate that this 
association reflects mainly the positive effect of religion concentration on the probability 
of state religion, rather than the reverse effect of state religion on concentration. 
  Theoretically, we expect that state religion would be more likely in countries with 
heavy representation in monotheistic religions.  Empirically, we find this positive relation   37
for Muslim adherence, but this relationship is not robust.  We find that location in sub 
Saharan Africa has a significantly negative effect on the probability of state religion.  We 
think that this relation reflects the strong competition among the major world religions 
for religious converts in Africa. 
  The secularization hypothesis predicts that increases in per capita GDP would 
reduce the probability of state religion.  We find little support for this hypothesis.  State 
religion is also unrelated to country size and to indicators of democracy, civil liberties, 
and the rule of law.  Former colonies as a whole do not differ from non-colonies in the 
likelihood of state religion.  However, British colonies are more likely than Spanish or 
Portuguese colonies to have a state religion.  Given prior colonial status, the probability 
of state religion is unrelated to the presence of British (common-law) or French (statute-
law) legal systems. 
  In future research, we plan to look more deeply at the interactions between state 
and religion, particularly at freedom of religious expression, regulation and subsidy of 
religion, and religiously inspired laws and regulations.  We want to consider further how 
freedom and regulation in the religion market relate to other forms of freedom and 
regulation.  Included here are freedoms of speech and mobility and the supervision of 
industry. 
  Our interest in this study began with the institution of state religion.  However, the 
methodology that we developed can be applied to studies of the long-term evolution of 
other legal and institutional features of countries.  For example, the method could be 
applied to the long-term evolution of monarchy, forms of electoral systems, government 
ownership, and so on.  We plan to consider these kinds of applications in future research.    38
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Countries with No State Religion in 2000, 1970, 1900 (N=72) 
      
Antigua Gabon  Mauritius  Seychelles 
Australia Gambia  Mexico  Sierra  Leone 
Austria Germany*  Micronesia  Singapore 
Belgium Ghana  Myanmar  Slovak  Rep. 
Belize Grenada  Namibia  Solomon  Isl. 
Bosnia Guinea  Niger  South  Africa 
Cameroon Guyana  Nigeria Suriname 
Canada Hungary Nicaragua  Switzerland 
Comoros India  Netherlands  Tanzania 
Congo (Brazz.)  Ivory Coast  New Zealand  Togo 
Cyprus Jamaica  Philippines  Trinidad 
Czech Rep.  Kenya  Papua N.G.  Uganda 
Djibouti Kiribati  Poland  United  States 
Dominica Lesotho  St.  Kitts  Uruguay 
Ecuador Madagascar  St.  Lucia  Vietnam 
Estonia Malawi  St.  Vincent  Yugoslavia 
Fiji Mali San  Marino  Zambia 
France Marshall  Islands  Senegal  Zimbabwe 
      
*Separated into East and West in 1970. 
 
 





Countries with State Religion in 2000, 1970, 1900 (N=58) 
    
Catholic (21)  Muslim (22)  Protestant (9) 
Andorra Afghanistan*  Bahamas 
Argentina Algeria  Denmark 
Bolivia Bahrain  Finland 
Colombia Brunei  Iceland 
Costa Rica  Egypt  Liberia 
Dominican Rep.  Iran  Norway 
El Salvador  Iraq  Samoa 
Guatemala Jordan  Tonga 
Haiti Kuwait United  Kingdom** 
Honduras Libya   
Italy Malaysia  Orthodox (1) 
Liechtenstein Maldives  Greece 
Luxembourg Mauritania   
Malta Morocco  Buddhist (4) 
Monaco Oman  Bhutan 
Panama Qatar  Cambodia*** 
Paraguay  Saudi Arabia  Sri Lanka 
Peru Somalia  Thailand 
Portugal Sudan   
Spain Tunisia Hindu (1) 
Venezuela  United Arab Emir.  Nepal 
 Yemen   
    
*Afghanistan lacked a state religion from 1978 until the mid 1990s. 
**Anglican in England, Presbyterian in Scotland.  Anglican disestablished in 
Ireland in 1869 and in Wales in 1919. 
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Table 1c  Countries with State Religion in 1900 
that Abandoned State Religion by 1970 (N=29) 
    
Catholic (7)  Protestant (2)  Confucian (4) 
Brazil Botswana  China 
Chile Indonesia  North  Korea 
Congo (Kinshasa)    South Korea 
Cuba  Orthodox (4)  Taiwan 
Equatorial Guinea  Kazakhstan   
Lithuania Latvia  Ethno-religion (7) 
Slovenia Romania  Benin 
  Russia Burkina  Faso 
Muslim (3)   Burundi 
Albania  Buddhist (2)  Central African Rep. 
Lebanon Japan*  Chad 
Turkey Mongolia  Rwanda 
   Swaziland 








Table 1d Countries with State Religion in 1900 
that Abandoned State Religion by 2000 (N=12) 
   
Catholic (6)  Muslim (1)  Orthodox (2) 
Angola Syria  Eritrea 
Cape Verde    Ethiopia 
Guinea-Bissau  Protestant (2)   
Ireland Barbados  Buddhist (1) 
Mozambique Sweden  Laos 
Sao Tome       45
 
 
Table 1e  Countries with State Religion in 1900  
that Abandoned State Religion by 1970 but 
Reinstated State Religion by 2000 (N=12) 
  
Catholic (1)  Orthodox (6) 
Croatia Armenia 
 Belarus 
Muslim (5)  Georgia 
Azerbaijan Macedonia 









Table 1f  Countries with No State Religion in 1900 









*Bangladesh lacked a state religion from 1972 to 1975. 
 
   
 
Table 1g  Countries with No State Religion in 1900 













Table 2  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
(unweighted averages across countries) 
    
Data for 2000 (N=188) 
Variable Mean  Stnd.  Dev. 
State religion  0.40  0.49 
Regime change  0.72  0.45 
Religion concentration  0.55  0.23 
Communist 0.03  0.16 
Muslim adherence share  0.23  0.35 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  0.26  0.44 
log(per capita GDP, 1996 US$)  8.33  1.04 
log(population, 1000s)  8.57  2.09 
British colony  0.31  0.47 
French colony  0.15  0.36 
Spanish & Portuguese colony  0.12  0.33 
Other colony  0.08  0.27 
Absolute degrees latitude  25.5  16.8 
Land-locked status  0.22  0.41 
British legal origin  0.32  0.47 
French legal origin  0.43  0.50 
Adherence shares:     
   Muslim 0.235  0.346 
   Catholic  0.289  0.332 
   Protestant  0.137  0.207 
   Other Christian  0.084  0.112 
   Orthodox  0.054  0.163 
   Jewish  0.005  0.056 
   Hindu  0.022  0.095 
   Buddhist 0.036  0.141 
   Other Eastern religion  0.019  0.071 
   Other religion  0.057  0.110 
   Non-religious  0.062  0.105 
   47
 
Table 2, continued 
Data for 1970 (N = 189*) 
Variable Mean  Stnd.  Dev. 
    
State religion  0.39  0.49 
Regime change  0.60  0.49 
Religion concentration  0.59  0.24 
Communist 0.18  0.39 
log(per capita GDP, 1996 US$)  8.02  1.14 
log(population, 1000s)  8.01  2.11 
Adherence shares:     
   Muslim 0.218  0.344 
   Catholic  0.298  0.353 
   Protestant  0.134  0.221 
   Other Christian  0.070  0.107 
   Orthodox  0.050  0.151 
   Jewish  0.006  0.062 
   Hindu  0.022  0.105 
   Buddhist 0.037  0.153 
   Other Eastern religion  0.016  0.071 
   Other religion  0.075  0.146 
   Non-religious  0.074  0.157 
    
*East and West Germany included separately. 
    
Data for 1900 (N = 188) 
State religion  0.59  0.49 
Religion concentration  0.74  0.20 
Adherence shares:     
   Muslim 0.214  0.357 
   Catholic  0.259  0.378 
   Protestant  0.127  0.264 
   Other Christian  0.028  0.073 
   Orthodox  0.065  0.200 
   Jewish  0.005  0.014 
   Hindu  0.022  0.101 
   Buddhist 0.041  0.164 
   Other Eastern religion  0.014  0.089 
   Other religion  0.222  0.361 
   Non-religious  0.003  0.027   48
 
Table 3  Linear Probability Models for State Religion in 2000 and 1970 
(standard errors of coefficients in parentheses) 
        
Estimation  method: SUR 3SLS SUR 3SLS SUR 3SLS 
Independent  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State religion, 1900, 
no regime change 































State religion, 1900, 
regime change 

























































































































p-value, colonies  -- -- -- --  0.022  0.008 
No. observations, 
  2000 and 1970 
188, 189  188, 189  188, 189  188, 189  188, 189  188, 189 
R-squared, 
  2000 and 1970 
0.56, 0.73  0.54, 0.72  0.56, 0.73  0.52, 0.70  0.58, 0.74  0.55, 0.72 
 
 
*p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01.   49
 
 
Note to Table 3 
 
  Constant terms are included but not shown. The dependent variable is a dummy 
for the presence of state religion in 2000 or 1970.  The sample for 1970, 189 countries, 
exceeds that for 2000, 188 countries, because East and West Germany are included 
separately in 1970.  The estimates weight all countries equally.  The equations are 
estimated as a system, using the seemingly-unrelated (SUR) technique in columns 1, 3, 
and 5, and three-stage least-square (3SLS) in columns 2, 4, and 6.  The instrument lists in 
columns 2, 4, and 6 exclude the contemporaneous values of religion concentration and the 
Muslim adherence share but include the 1900 values (along with interaction terms with the 
regime-change variable).  The instrument lists for columns 4 and 6 also replace the 
contemporaneous value of the log of per capita GDP by the absolute value of degrees latitude and 
a dummy variable for land-locked status, along with interactions of these variables with the 
regime-change variable.  In column 6, the dummy variables for colonial status appear in the 
instrument lists, along with interactions with the regime-change variable.     50
  
Table 4  Probit Model for State Religion in 2000 and 1970 
(standard errors of coefficients in parentheses) 
    






State religion in 1900, no regime change, 




State religion in 1900, no regime change, 




State religion in 1900, regime change, 




State religion in 1900, regime change, 




Religion concentration  5.69** 
(1.17) 
0.73 
Communism  -3.77** 
(1.08) 
-0.42 
Lagged Communism  -0.47 
(0.69) 
-0.06 
Muslim adherence share  1.93 
(1.04) 
0.25 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -3.22** 
(0.92) 
-0.42 
Number of observations, 2000 and 1970  188, 189   
Pseudo R-squared, 2000 and 1970  0.66, 0.74   
% correctly predicted    
   overall sample  90% (339/377)   
   state religion sample  91% 134/148)   
   no state religion sample  90% (205/229)   
   2000 sample  86% (162/188)   
   1970 sample  94% (177/189)   
 
*p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01. 
Note:  Constant terms are included but not shown.  For the continuous variables (religion 
concentration and Muslim religion share), the marginal effects in column 2 show the sample 
average of the effect on the probability of state religion from a marginal change in each 
independent variable.  For the dummy variables, column 2 shows the sample average effect on 
the probability of state religion from a shift from zero to one in each variable.  For state religion 
in 1900, the averaging is over sub-samples defined by 2000 or 1970 and no regime change or 
regime change.  See the text (n. 28) for a discussion of the probit estimation. 